February, 1939

NOTES
Guaranty and Suretyship in Pennsylvania-An Attempt at
Clarification
It has often been said that the concept of suretyship is one of the oldest
of recognized legal relations.1 In the days of simple barter and sale transactions, there was little confusion as to the rights and liabilities of this third
party obligor, but with the developing complexities of modern commercial
dealings, suretyship law has become greatly obscured by a confusion of
terms and a corresponding inconsistency in the declaration of rights and
liabilities.2 Courts have varied in their use of the terms surety, guarantor,
endorser and indemnitor, at times treating them as synonymous and on
other occasions placing different meanings upon them. As a result, consebeen attributed to each without regard to the sepaquences have sometimes
rate factual situations.8 Despite the various attempts on the part of commentators, courts, and text writers to formulate definitions of the various
terms, 4 no satisfactory definitive solution has been found. That definition
of terms is not a satisfactory solution of the problem is evidenced by the
confusion among the various writers,5 and by the seeming impossibility of
framing definitions specific enough to deal with the hodge-podge of wording
in loosely drawn contracts. The most satisfactory of the broad definitions
adopted by courts and writers alike is that where the liability of the accommodating party is intended to be unconditional and co-extensive with that
of the principal debtor, a suretyship relation arises, while where the liability
is conditioned upon notice or proof of uncollectability against the principal
debtor the relation is one of guaranty. 6 This latter type of party is most
commonly known as a guarantor of collection . 7 However, even these categories are meaningless unless each is connected with a different set of
consequences. The consequences attributed by the Pennsylvania courts to
the above general categories will be discussed in a subsequent section of
this Note.8 It would seem unnecessary to use any established category since
liability imposed by the terms of the contract is factually either unconditional or subject to the conditions imposed by the contract itself. But, such
an ideal solution of the problem is also impossible because of the traditional
and frequent usage of the terms surety and guarantor by both the courts
i. Lloyd, The Surety (1918) 66 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 40; Arnold, Primary and Sec-

ondary Obligations (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 36; Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship
(I92M) 17 CALIF. L. REV. 6o5.
2. ARANT, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (193i)
3. Id. at 20.

13.

4. ARANT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14; Radin, supra note i, at 23; Cormack and
io So. CALI. L. REv. 37,; Arnold, supra

McCarroll, Suretyship and Guaranty (937)
note I, at 41.

S.Ibid.

6. ARANT, op. cit. supra.note 2, at 20.
7. Id. at 8. The usual conditions to liability of a guarantor of collection are (i)
notice of default on the part of the principal obligor, and (2) proof of due diligence and
uncollectibility as against the principal obligor. The Pennsylvania cases do not seem
to be much concerned with the first of these conditions.
8. Infra p. 470.
(465)
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and the parties to the contract. Thus, the most useful guides in this field
of confusion are the above two definitions, and the extent to which the
parties insert conditions in the contract will determine to what extent the
relation will be treated as one of guaranty rather than of suretyship.
In 1913, the Pennsylvania legislature attempted to place a limitation on
the broad definition set out above. It declared that "every written agreement . . .made by one person to answer for the default of another shall
subject such person to the liabilities of suretyship, and shall confer upon
him the rights incident thereto, unless such agreement shall contain in
substance the words: 'This is not intended to be a contract of suretyship' . . . ".9 While the statute does not define any terms, it does imply the

existence of at least two categories, guaranty and suretyship. It seems
reasonable to assume, then, that the legislature intended to continue the use
of the pre-existing categories created by the courts before the passage of the
Act. The present discussion, therefore, first will be directed at an inquiry
into conditions antedating the Act of 1913 in an effort to discern any settled
rules of law and consistency or inconsistency in the use of terms; and thereafter, an examination of the cases following the Act will be made in order
to determine the extent to which the former classifications have been abandoned and new definitions adopted.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The development of a definite distinction between the terms "guarantor" and "surety" had its beginning almost concurrently in the English
Common Law and in America.' 0 Although the earliest recorded case purporting to set up a distinction was decided in a Massachusetts court,1 ' the
Pennsylvania court soon followed suit. The use of the word "guarantor"12
in Pennsylvania is first found in 1822 in the case of Gibbs v. Cannon
which held that while lack of notice of default could be asserted as a defense
by an endorser, such defense was not available to the "guarantor". Five
years later, in Rudy v. Wolf,'" the Court, while not using the term "guarantor", points out the difference between an absolute and a conditional
engagement. In that case, it was decided that while an absolute engagement
imposes a duty on the third party obligor to pay the debt at once if the
principal debtor defaults, a conditional engagement subjects the third party
obligor to a lesser duty, i. e., to pay the money on the insolvency of the

principal debtor provided the creditor has used ordinary diligence 1 4 for
collection. The theory of this case was adopted by the same court in 1831 15

and the conditional engagement was called a guaranty. Since that time,
refinement and definition of this general theory, that a surety must pay if
the debtor does not and a guarantor only if the debtor cannot, has constituted the bulk of the case law on the subject of suretyship and guaranty in
9.PA. STAT. AxN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 8, § i.
Io. Lloyd, loc. cit. supra note i. But see Radin, supra note i, at 618, to the effect
that the distinction had its origin in Pennsylvania.
ii. Hunt v. Adams, 6 Mass. 519 (1810). It is questionable whether this case
really made a distinction.
12. 9 S. & R. 198 (Pa. 1822).
13. 16 S. & R. 79 (Pa. 1827).

14. Although the consequences of lack of ordinary diligence will be subsequently
discussed, it might be well to point out here that it means an effort to collect against
the principal debtor within a reasonable time after the debt becomes due. See infra
P. 470.
I5.Johnston v. Chapman, 3 P. & W. 18 (Pa. x83i).

NOTE

Pennsylvania until 1913
"6 when the legislature attempted to prescribe a
17
general classification.
DEFINITION PRIOR TO THE ACT OF 1913

Since it was early apparent that the courts would give no conclusive
effect to the words "guarantor" or "surety", as used in the obligation,"' it
was necessary to develop rules to determine whether the engagement was
absolute or conditional. In some cases the distinction made little or no
difference,19 but in cases where the third party obligor set up the defense of
lack of due diligence or lack of notice on the part of the creditor plaintiff,
the distinction was essential. 20 Thus, the great body of the Pennsylvania
case law on the subject is concerned with the establishment of the following
tests for determining whether the obligation is one of guaranty or of surety.
(I) The Wording of the Obligation
The starting point in the field of definition of terms was the specific
wording of the obligation itself,21 its aim being to give as much effect as
possible to the expressed intention of the parties.22 At first, the courts
decided whether or not certain words and combinations of words indicated
an absolute or conditional2 liability, and, after a few years, such terms as
"security for fulfillment", "I will see the within paid", 24 "I will be responsible for",25 and guaranty of payment "when due",28 or "according to its
terms" 27 became recognized as conclusive of absolute liability. And, by
1883, the court had adopted a policy of reviewing the specific obligations in
the cases and attempting to determine why certain words were held to
connote an absolute and some a conditional liability.2" This led to the
establishment of the most important and most interesting test developed by
the courts, namely, the definiteness of the terms of the obligation.
The Definiteness of the Terms of the Obligation
The rule generally stated by the courts in the early decisions was that
if the terms of the obligation are made definite either by the main engagement or by the specific engagement of the third party obligor, the liability
is absolute (surety). Otherwise, the liability is conditional (guaranty). 29
This doctrine was first promulgated in a Philadelphia District Court case in
(2)

6. Brown v. Brooks, 25 Pa. 21o (1855) ; Reigart v. White, 52 Pa. 438 (1866);
Kramph's Ex'rs v. Hatz's Ex'rs, 52 Pa. 525 (1866); Bartholomay Brewery Co. v.
Thomaier, 2 Pa. Super. 345 (i86) ; Supplee v. Herrmann, I6 Pa. Super. 45 (I9oi).
17. PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 8, § i.

18. Riddle v. Thompson, 1o4 Pa. 330 (1883). But see Johnston v. Chapman, 3 P.
& W. i8 (Pa. 1831) indicating that the term "guarantee" has great effect
19. APANT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14.

Supra note 16.
21. Reigart v. White, 52 Pa. 438 (1866) ; Gardiner v. Lloyd,
20.

562 (1885).
22. Marberger v. Pott, I6 Pa. 9 (i85i).

1o3

iio Pa. 278, 2 At.

23. Ibid.
24. Ashton v. Bayard, 71 Pa. 139 (1872).
25. Amsbaugh v. Gearhart, ii Pa. 482 (1849).
26. Supplee v. Herrmann, i6 Pa. Super. 45 (1901).
27. Campbell v. Baker, 46 Pa. 243 (1863).
28. Roberts v. Riddle, 79 Pa. 468 (1875).
29. Campbell v. Baker, 46 Pa. 243 (1863) ; Zahm v. First Nat'l Bank of Lancaster,
Pa. 576 (1883) ; McBeth v. Newlin, I5 W. N. C. 129 (Pa. 1884). This definition

is open to question as a test because an engagement may be definite in terms, yet subject to specific conditions.
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1836 30 and later confirmed in 1863 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
the leading case of Campbell v. Baker.8 ' In that case, however, absolute hability was designated not as a suretyship obligation but as an obligation of
special guaranty, while the term for conditional liability was general guaranty.
Even though this language occasionally recurs in the cases, it is now well settled that the term special guarantor and surety are one and the same thing,
the effect of both being that the creditor does not have to proceed first against
the principal debtor. 2 However, an examination of the factual situations in
the early cases and the rule as stated in later cases 83 reveals that the rule is
more specific than the above general statement. In all of the cases in which
the general rule, i. e., as to absolute and conditional engagements, has been
advanced, the definiteness of the time of default of the accommodating
party's obligation has determined the absoluteness of the engagement. If
the time is fixed in the writing signed by the accommodating party, it is
clear that the obligation of the accommodating party becomes absolute at
that time and the engagement is one of suretyship."' If the time of default
is not fixed by the collateral writing and the principal contract is also indefinite as to the due date, the engagement is dearly one of guaranty. 5 Most
litigation on this subject, however, concerns those cases in which the time
of default is fixed in the principal obligation but not in the obligation of the
accommodating party. The question then arises as to whether the wording
of the collateral obligation shows an intent to become bound immediately on
the default of the principal obligation. In construing the language of the
various obligations, the courts have held that when the time of default of
the main obligation is fixed, a collateral promise to pay the "within note
when due","8 a guarantee of punctual8 7 or prompt 88 payment, or payment
of "the within bond according to its terms" 39 constitutes a showing of
sufficient definiteness to make the obligation one of suretyship. However,
even though the time of default is fixed in the principal obligation, such
promises as "I guarantee the payment of the within note for value received" 4 0 and "I hereby guaranty payment of the within note without protest" 41 have been held to create only a guaranty relation. Apparently, when
the principal obligation is a demand note,4 2 the showing of intent in the
30. Cochran v. Dawson, i Miles 276 (Pa. D. C. 1863). See also Grand Life Ins.
Co. v. Finley, i Phila. 7o (Pa. 185o).
31. 46 Pa. 243 (1863).
32. Hartley Silk Mfg. Co. v. Berg, 48 Pa. Super. 419 (1911).
33. Campbell v. Baker, 46 Pa. 243 (1863) ; Homewood Peoples Bank v. Hastings,
263 Pa. 260, lo6 Atl. 308 (i9ig) ; Butler Savings & Trust Co. v. Phillips, 79 Pa. Super.

318 (1922).

34. Riddle v. Thompson, 104 Pa. 33o (1883) ("guarantee" of payment in "one year
after date").
35. Columbia Baking Co. v. Schissler, 35 Pa. Super. 62x (Igo8).
36. Campbell v. Baker, 46 Pa. 243 (1863). See also Hartley Silk Mfg. Co. v.
("I will guarantee payment thereof should (X) not
Berg, 48 Pa. Super. 419 (I9)
pay when due").
37. Drake v. Philadelphia & R. R. R. Co., 21 W. N. C. 122 (Pa. 1888).
38. Iron City Nat'l Bank v. Rafferty, 207 Pa. :238, 56 Ati. 445 (19o3) ; McBeth v.
Newlin, 15 W. N. C. 129 (Pa. 1884).
39. Roberts v. Riddle, 79 Pa. 468 (1875).
See also Iset v. Hoge, 2 Watts 128 (Pa.
40. Mizner v. Spier, 96 Pa. 533 (880).
1833) (guaranty of payment of the "above note").
41. Zahm v. First Nat'l Bank of Lancaster, 103 Pa. 576 (z883).
42. When a note is negotiable, there is some doubt in the early cases as to whether
the common law principles of suretyship and guaranty or the law of negotiable instruments is controlling. A strong opinion in Snevily v. Eckel, I W. & S. 203 (Pa. 1841)
holds that the former applies. A subsequent dictum, however, in Dunning v. Heller,

NOTE

collateral writing does not have to be as specific as for a time obligation.4 3
It has also been held that an obligation definite as to time will not be rendered indefinite by a clause which permits extensions of the obligation
without the consent of or notice to the accommodating party." Thus, the
courts seem to like the test of definiteness. However, they purport to use it
as synonymous with or as a refinement of the absolute and conditional test.
This cannot be accurate because it overlooks the fact that a contract can be
definite as to time and still be subject to conditions. The only virtue of
the test of definiteness lies in the fact that it is comparatively easy to apply,
but it is very questionable that it will in the majority of cases give true
effect to the intent of the parties which in the last analysis is the real basis
for making a distinction. Also, close situations will still arise as in Butler
Savings and Trust Co. v. Phillips-5 which was one of the last cases to be
decided by the Superior Court before the Act. 46 In that case, certain shareholders of a land company "guaranteed" a bond and mortgage, held by the
land company, to the plaintiff bank. The terms of the bond and mortgage
were definite and the amount for which each shareholder was to be liable
was fixed by the agreement. The court held, however, that since the time
when the promisor was to assume liability was indefinite, the contract was
one of guaranty and the bank must first exhaust its remedy against the
principal debtor. Probably, if it had been a demand note or if the words
"when due" had been inserted after47the "guaranty", the liability would have
been construed to be one of surety.
Out of this test of definiteness, the following special classifications have
been developed:
(a) Guarantiesof future credit. This group of cases especially is concerned with the question of notice of the acceptance of an offer to guarantee
contracts which are to be completed from time to time in the future. In
these cases, although the terms of the obligation are usually fixed, the
promise itself is conditional in that it is a promise to be responsible for
obligations to accrue in the future. The courts early placed these cases in a
separate category and have been very strict in requiring notice of acceptance
to be proved. 48 Notice is required even in those cases where the promise
of "guaranty" has been given at the precedent request of the creditor or
debtor. 49 Although the general language in these cases indicates that the
1o3 Pa. 269, 272 (1883) indicates that the latter controls. See Note (1924) 72 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 296, 299. Recent cases on the subject apparently disregard the N. I. L. and
apply the Act of 1913. Rochester Bank v. Fry, 294 Pa. 425, 144 At. 416 (1928) ;
Bloomfield Trust Co. v. Trojanowski, 298 Pa. 6I, 147 At. 847 (1929); Brock's Assigned Estate No. 2, 312 Pa. 18, i66 At. 782 (1933).
43. A demand note endorsed "I hereby guarantee payment of the within note and
waive demand, protest and notice of protest on the same", was held to create a surety
obligation in Homewood Peoples Bank v. Hastings, 263 Pa. 26o, io6 Ati. 3o8 (1919)
while a time note with substantially the same endorsement was held to create only a
guaranty relation in Zahm v. First Nat'1 Bank of Lancaster, io3 Pa. 576 (1883). Apparently contra to the Zahrn case is Shaffstall v. McDaniel, 152 Pa. 598, 25 Atl. 576

(x893) where an endorsement of a time note "I guarantee the within note's payment"
was held to be a surety obligation.
44. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 63 Pa. Super. 294 (igi6).
45. 79 Pa. Super. 318 (1922).
46. The transactions occurred in 191i. Id. at 319.
47. Campbell v. Baker, 46 Pa. 243 (1863) ; Homewood Peoples Bank v. Hastings,
263 Pa. 260, io6 Atl. 3o8 (i919).

48. Acme Mfg. Co. v. Reed, 197 Pa. 359, 47 Atl. 205 (9oo).
49. Kay v. Allen, 9 Pa. 320 (1848) ; Coe and Richmond v. Buehler, 11o Pa. 366, 5
At. 20 (1885).
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liability of the so-called "guarantor" is conditional and that notice of acceptance is required, there is no square holding as to whether or not lack of due
diligence on the part of the creditor would defeat a claim under an otherwise
validly accepted contract. It is indicated, however, that there being a conditional or contingent obligation, the ordinary consequences of a "guaranty"
obligation would apply. 50
(b) Endorsement of a lease. This second sub-classification differs
only slightly from the ordinary guaranty of future credit, but has been
subjected to a much higher degree of liability."' The ordinary form of the
endorsement, an agreement to be responsible for the true and faithful performance of the "within lease", was first held to impose only the conditional
liability of guaranty and lack of due diligence was a defense.52 However, in
Allen v. Hubert5 3 decided in 1865, the court held an agreement to become
"security" for the faithful performance of a lease to impose an absolute
liability. Such a view is consistent with the earlier construction of the
word "security". 54 Yet, in later cases construing the ordinary form of
endorsement, Allen v. Hubert has been followed and generally the liability
of suretyship is imposed without regard to the wording of the obligation. 5
(3) Consequences of the Distinction
Up to this point, the discussion has been confined to a consideration
of the tests used to differentiate between contracts of suretyship and those
of guaranty. Only incidentally have the differing consequences of applying
one or the other of the standard labels been mentioned. However, in order
to show the reason for making the distinction and in order to compare the
cases subsequent to the Act of 1913, it is necessary to determine the consequences of the two relations prior to the Act. The first and most important
distinction is the requirement of due diligence in the guaranty relation. In
other words, it has been generally held that a surety's liability arises immediately on the default of the principal debtor since the surety's engagement
is absolute, while, on the other hand, the liability of a guarantor arises only
after the creditor has exhausted his remedies against the principal debtor
or has shown that such procedure would be fruitless. 58 The question of
due diligence is one of fact for the jury and is usually proved by the showing of insolvency of the principal debtor and the exercise of a reasonable
effort by the guarantee to prosecute his claim promptly. 57
Next important of the distinctions is the requirement of notice of
acceptance of the offer of guaranty. This requirement is important in
5o. Gardiner v. Lloyd, 11o Pa. 278, 2 Atl. 562 (1885).
51. There seems to be no real distinction between a guaranty of future credit and
an endorsement of a lease except that the latter is more formal and thus apparently
more definite.
52. Gilbert v. Henck, 30 Pa. 205 (I858). This case was later overruled by Reigart
v. White, 52 Pa. 438 (1866) and still later cited with approval by a lower court in
Bickel v. Auner, 9 Phila. 499 (Pa. 1872).
53. 49 Pa. 259 (1865).
54. Marberger v. Pott, 16 Pa. 9 (85I).
55. Korn v. Hohl, 8o Pa. 333 (1876) ; Haynes v. Synnott, 16o Pa. 18o, 28 Atl. 832
(1894) ; Supplee v. Herrmann, 16 Pa. Super. 45 (1gol) ; Dreutlein v. Young, 45 Phila.
C. C. 624 (Pa. 1917).

56. Johnston v. Chapman, 3 P. & W. 18 (Pa. 1831).
57. Hoffman v. Bechtel, 52 Pa. 19o (1866) ; National B. & L. v. Lichtenwalner, ioo
Pa. ioo (1883) (Return of nulla bona to a fi. fa. is prima facie evidence of due diligence but not conclusive. Creditor is not obliged to pursue every claim his debtor may
have especially where such claim is contingent and uncertain.).
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Pennsylvania only in cases concerning guaranties of future credit since in
cases where the guaranty is of an immediate obligation, the courts consider
the guaranty as accepted when given. 5s The reasons usually asserted for
requiring notice are that the ordinary rules of contract law must apply and
the continuing offer of guaranty is not valid until accepted and notice given,
and also, that the liability of the guarantor being only contingent, he is held
less strictly accountable and should not be held liable if he has not received
notice fixing the extent of his liability.59
A third distinction concerns the time of the running of the Statute of
Limitations. Since the surety's obligation is considered as absolute and
coexistent with that of the principal debtor, the statute is said to run from
the maturity date of the note. The guarantor's obligation, on the other
hand, being contingent, does not ripen into an actionable liability until the
guarantee has exhausted his remedy against the principal debtor. Thus, the
statute does not begin to run against the guarantor until after a reasonable
time for the exercise of due diligence. 60
The development in the commercial world of professional surety companies who, for a consideration, become third party obligors, was recognized
by the courts as a distinct problem as early as 191o,61- and the distinction
between compensated and gratuitous accommodating parties is now firmly
established in the Pennsylvania cases. 62 It is generally held that the rule
of strictissimi juris is applied to gratuitous but not to compensated "sureties". This means that in many instances, acts of a creditor which might
possibly be detrimental to the accommodating party will discharge the latter
if gratuitous but if compensated there will
be no discharge in the absence
63
of proof of prejudice resulting therefrom.
In summary then, it seems that there are only two types of accommodating parties recognized in the common law of Pennsylvania: a surety
and a guarantor of collection. The surety's liability is absolute and ripens
with that of the principal debtor while the guarantor of collection is liable
only after the guarantee has proceeded with due diligence against the principal debtor.
TiiE ACT OF 1913 AND ITS EFFECT
Although before the Act, the courts had pigeon-holed the law of
suretyship into various standardized categories, the problem of definition
in many cases was still confused by the wording of the instruments and
many inconsistencies developed. The legislature, in attempting to standardize the definition and eliminate the existing confusion, passed the Act of
1913, which, apparently unwittingly, codified a doctrine enunciated in the
early case of Craddock v. Armor.64 This case held that "absence of apt
words to indicate a contingent responsibility showed that the parties intended to be jointly bound" and the third party obligor was termed an
immediate party and not a guarantor. The Act, however, instead of ending
the confusion of terms, seems to have set up a new series of problems: (i)
58. Acme Mfg. Co. v. Reed, 197 Pa. 359, 47 Ati. 205 (19oo).
59. See Ross v. Leberman, 298 Pa. 574, 148 At. 858 (93o) ; Sullivan Smythefield
Co. v. Welsh, 91 Pa. Super. 413 (1927). See also Sullivan, Suretyship Law in Pennsyl-

vania (1Q3o) 5 Tzmip. L. Q. 66.
6o. Homewood Peoples Bank v. Hastings, 263 Pa. 26o, io6 At. 3o8 (igig).
61. Young v. American Bonding Co.,

228

Pa. 373, 77 AtI. 623 (I91o).

62. Phillips v. American Liability & Surety Co., 3o9 Pa. 1, 162 At. 435
63. Ibid.
64. 1o Watts 258 (Pa. 184o).

(1932).
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What are the consequences of suretyship under the Act? (2) How much
is required to negative the presumption of suretyship? (3) Is the Act
conclusive? The remainder of this discussion will be devoted to a consideration of these problems in an attempt to determine whether they have
been satisfactorily answered by the courts.
(i)

The Consequences of Suretyship Under the Act of i9x3

It is natural that, inasmuch as the cases before the Act had set up
various liabilities arising from calling the obligation one of suretyship, those
consequences should be attributed to all cases after the Act which by the
terms of the Act must be designated as imposing a suretyship relation.
Thus, it is found that the decisions uniformly hold that the creditor need
not prove due diligence or the insolvency of the principal debtor, 5 nor need
he first proceed against the collateral. 6 6 But, as to the question of requiring
notice of the acceptance of a guaranty of future credit which under the Act
might have to be called a surety transaction, great confusion remains. The
closest case decided since the Act is the Superior Court case of Sullivan
Sinythefield Co. v. Welsh 67 in which the obligation was as follows: "The
purchases of (the debtor) from you this week I will personally guarantee.".
The court held this to constitute a suretyship relation under the Act and
that it was unnecessary to decide the question of notice of acceptance.
However, there is some language to the effect that the reasons for requiring
such notice still exist.68 The law as to the commencement of the running
of the Statute of Limitations is unchanged and once the relation is found to
be a surety obligation under the Act, the Statute is applied as before.69
(2)

Negativing the Presumption of Suretyship

The Act declares that the obligation shall be construed to be one of
suretyship unless it "shall contain in substance the words: 'This is not
intended to be a contract of suretyship'." 70 However, the cases give little
indication of an attempt to set up a guaranty or less than surety obligation
by compliance with the terms of the Act. The only case directly in point is
Waber's Estate,71 in which the obligation was signed by X as builder and
owner and by Y and Z as "guarantors only". The court held that this was
not sufficient compliance with the Act and thus, Y and Z were sureties.
Apparently, a literal compliance with the wording of the Act is necessary.
(3)

Conclusiveness of the Act

Although there is no specific language in the cases as to the conclusiveness of the Act, it is interesting to note that there are very few cases which
are based solely on the authority of the Act.7 2 In fact, in most of the cases,
the court first reviews the common law decisions setting up distinctions
between guaranty and suretyship, and then, after maldng its determination,
65. Miners State Bank v. Auksztokalnis, 283 Pa. z8, 128 Atl. 726 (1925) ; Brock's
Assigned Estate No. 1, 312 Pa. 7, 166 At. 778 (1933).
66. Homewood Peoples Bank v. Cull, 72 Pitts. L. J. 986 (Pa. 1924).
67. 91 Pa. Super. 413 (,927).
68. Id. at 417.
69. Rochester Bank v. Fry, 294 Pa. 425, 144 Atl. 426 (1928).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 293o) tit. 8, § i.
71. 2o Pa. D. & C. 490 (933), aff'd, 327 Pa. 497, 177 At. 51 (1935).
72. Thommen v. Aldine Trust Co., 302 Pa. 4o9, 153 At!. 750 (1931); Halpern v.
Axelrod, 120 Pa. Super. 352, 183 Atl. 94 (1936) ; Smith v. Strickler, 123 Pa. Super.
i81, 186 Atl. 369 (1936).
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cites the Act.7 3 In none of these cases, however, has the common law
decision been found to be at variance with the holding under the Act.
There are three Supreme Court cases in which the Act has not been
cited and the distinction between guaranty and suretyship made on common
law grounds. The first of these cases was decided in 1926.74 It involved
a writing on the back of a demand note and the wording of the obligation
was as follows: "guarantee the payment of the (within note) at maturity,
waiving protest, demand, notice and all defenses arising out of lack of diligence in enforcing payment.". The court decided that this being an agreement to pay at maturity was a contract of surety.
More surprising and of much greater significance is the case of League
Island Building and Loan Association v. Doyle, 5 decided in 1936. In that
case, the Supreme Court not only did not cite the Act of 1913 but decided
that the relationship was one of guaranty and lack of due diligence was a
defense. The obligation was worded: if the creditor "should at any time
suffer any loss by reason of (the) loan (the obligor will) hold (himself)
responsible for the same.". 7 6 The effect of the Act of 1913 was the main
point of contention in the brief of the accommodating party. It was there
argued that "the statute cannot change the nature of a contract. If our contract is one of guaranty, that is to say, conditional guaranty, this statute
cannot make it one of absolute guaranty, because it is fundamental that the
parties can make any contract they see fit." 77 The brief then cited Purdy v.
Massey 75 for the proposition that the covenants in a bond should be construed to mean what the parties intended. The court in its opinion in the
League Island case, deciding that the contract was one of guaranty, did not
mention the Act of 1913 or the contention of the "guarantor" as to its effect.
It did, however, cite with approval Purdy v. Massey, arguing in part that
"The words used in the contract . . . leave no one in doubt as to what the
parties intended. There was no definite date set when the liability was to
accrue except that it was to accrue when the (guarantee) should 'suffer any
loss by reason of (the) loan'." 79 The implications of this case are great.
It seems to indicate that if the contract is one of "guaranty" judged by the
test of definiteness, the Act of 1913 does not apply. Perhaps it means that
an agreement to be responsible for any loss is not an agreement to answer
for the default of another.80 But, all this can be nothing more than conjecture because of the vague language of the opinion. However, it is very
evident that the Act of 1913 can in no sense be said to be conclusive and the
common law tests are still of great importance in affixing a label to the
relationship.
In a case decided in 1938, Putnam v. Pittsburg Ry.,81 the obligation
involved was "a guaranty" of the prompt payment of the principal and
73. Brock's Assigned Estate No. 1, 312 Pa. 7, 166 Atl. 778 (1933) ; Cohen v. Bank
of Phila., 1o2 Pa. Super. 279, i56 Atl. 631 (1930).
74. Lincoln Bank v. Gem City Wholesale Co., 286 Pa. 421, 133 Atl. 554 (1926).
75. 323 Pa. 287, 185 Atl. 636 (1936).
76. Id. at 288, 637.
77. Brief of Appellee, Jan. Term, 1935, No. 466, at p. 6.
78. 306 Pa. 288, 159 Atl. 545 (1932).
79. 323 Pa. 287, 29o, 185 Atl. 636, 638.
So. See Roberts Trust Estate, 316 Pa. 545, 175 At. 869 (934) where the following
agreement was involved: X deposited money with Y Bank as trustee, Y Bank agreeing
to invest and reinvest and on demand of X to pay back the res in cash. The Supreme
Court held this not to be a suretyship obligation because it was the bank's own obligation and not an agreement to answer for the default of another.
81. 330 Pa. 2IO, gg Atl. 211 (1938).
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interest of bonds as they "shall become due and payable". Again, the court
neglected to cite the Act and held that the obligation may be one of surety
notwithstanding the use of the word "guaranty".8 2
CONCLUSION

It is evident from the above discussion that the Act of 1913 has not
eliminated the confusion in the surety and guaranty cases in Pennsylvania.
Further, it is questionable that it has helped the problem of definition. With
the tendency in the more recent cases to cite the Act merely in passing or
to totally disregard it, there remains some question as to how conclusive
this legislative prescription may be. The statute has at most merely carried
forth the categories used prior to its enactment. The same confusion and
the same problems continue to exist. The statute does attempt to lay down
a test which is reasonably explicit and based on the wording of the contract.
Thus, one would expect that in all of the cases arising since the statute the
courts would address themselves to the following statutory mandate:
".. . every written agreement . . .made by one person to answer
for the default of another shall subject such person to the liabilities of
suretyship, and shall confer upon him the rights incident thereto, unless
such agreement shall contain in substance the words: 'This is not intended to be a contract of suretyship' . . ." 58
This test has not been applied as effectively as it might be and the
League Island case strongly indicates that in some cases it will not be applied at all. The statute could be made more effective by defining the terms
"surety" and "guarantor" and by expressing the consequences arising
therefrom. Until that is done and until the problem of application created
by the League Island case is clarified, the law of suretyship in Pennsylvania
will remain in a state of confusion even greater than that existing prior to
the enactment of the statute.
R.H.S.
82. There are a number of cases in which the distinction is not important where
the courts still use "guarantee" language. See, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Foley, 311 Pa. 477, 166 At. 909 (1933) (use of "ejusdem generis" rule to determine
the extent of liability under the contract) ; Globe Indemnity Co. v. McCullom, 313 Pa.
135, 169 AtI. 76 (1933)

; Talcott v. Levy,

123

Pa. Super. 94, 186 Atl.

251

(1936)

(ques-

tion of cancellation) ; Quinto v. Stein, 123 Pa. Super. iog, i86 Atl. 28o (1936) (release) ; In re Rittenhouse Hotel, 31 Pa. D. & C. 533 (1938).
There is also a group of cases involving the distinction between surety and indemnity against loss, the latter being sometimes loosely referred to as a guaranty. The
consequences of each relation differ only as to the amount of damages awarded, the
damages for the breach of an indemnity against loss being merely compensation for the
loss while the damages for a breach of the surety relation are measured by the cost of
completion. These cases are restricted to professional sureties on construction contracts. See Purdy v. Massey, 306 Pa. 288, 159 Atl. 545 (1932).
83. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 8, § i (italics supplied).

